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I.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

Whether the Grease Spot is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.

II.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY

A.

The Harnes are Not Entitled to Recover Attorney Fees Incurred in
Arbitration

It is not permissible to award attorney fees in arbitration unless the arbitration
agreement expressly so provides. I.C. § 7-910; Storrer v. Kier Construction Corporation,
129 Idaho 745, 746, 932 P.2d 373 (Ct. App. 1997). Furthermore, there is no:
... basis to conclude that the legislature, in enacting I. C. §
12-120(3), intended to grant parties an independent right of
action simply for the recovery of attorney fees incurred in
arbitration, when such fees clearly cannot be awarded as
part of the arbitration.
Id., 129 Idaho at 747.
Hames rely heavily on I.C. § 41-1839, and the case law which is developed
around that statute, as support for their position here. That reliance is misplaced.
I.C. § 41-1839 is an implied term in every insurance contract. Emery v. United
Pacific Insurance Company, 120 Idaho 244,247, 815 P.2d 442 (1991). In Pendlebury v.
Western Casualty and Surety Company, 89 Idaho 456, 406 P.2d 129 (1965), the court

described it as:
... axiomatic that the obligation of I.C. § 41-1839 became
part and parcel of the contract of insurance to the same
effect as though incorporated therein.
89 Idaho at 470.

The axiom referenced in the Pendlebury decision arises from numerous cases in
which statutes regulating the business of insurance were claimed to unconstitutionally
impair contractual obligations.

For example, in Penrose v. Commercial Travelers

Insurance Company, 75 Idaho 524, 275 P.2d 969 (1954), the insurance company
challenged the enforceability of an attorney fees statute relative to an insurance policy
issued before the statute was passed. With respect to this challenge, the Penrose court
held:
The particular statute relates to insurance business carried
on in this state; such business is affected with the public
interest and the private rights of contract in relation thereto
must be and are subjected to the valid exercise of the police
Intermountain Lloyds v.
power by the legislature.
Diefendorf 51 Idaho 304, 5 P.2d 730. It is under the
inherent police power vested in the legislature that it saw fit
to subject any insurance company, where an action is filed
and successfully prosecuted to judgment in any court in this
state for recovery on any of its policies issued herein, to the
payment of a reasonable attorney's fee.
75 Idaho at 537.
In Halliday v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 89 Idaho 293, 404 P.2d 634
(I 965), a successful plaintiff on an uninsured motorist claim against his automobile

insurance company was awarded attorney fees under LC.§ 41-1839. The written demand
made against the insurance company before the plaintiff filed suit was substantially
greater than the verdict rendered by the jury. However, the insurance company did not
ever tender any amount "justly due" to the plaintiff. The insurance company appealed the
attorney fees awarded under Idaho Code § 41-1839, claiming that because the amount
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originally demanded by the plaintiff exceeded the amount of the verdict, the statute did
not authorize an award of attorney fees. 89 Idaho at 295-296.
On appeal, the Supreme Court quoted with approval portions of the analysis set
forth in Penrose v. Commercial Travelers Insurance Company, 75 Idaho 524, 275 P.2d
969 (1954):
... The parties entered into the insurance contract charged
with the knowledge of the reserved police power of the
state which may at any time be invoked in the promotion of
the general welfare by enlarging from time to time the
remedies and procedures in connection with insurance
contracts ....
89 Idaho at 299 (quoting 75 Idaho at 539).
As the above authorities indicate, the nature of the insurance business is unique,
rendering insurance companies subject to legislative authority not ordinarily applicable to
businesses in general. One manifestation of this circumstance is that LC. § 41-1839 is
rendered part of every insurance policy in Idaho.

It is because LC. § 41-1839 is an implied contractual provision of every
insurance policy that LC.§ 7-910 and LC.§ 41-1839 were reconciled and reconcilable in
Emery v. United Pacific Insurance Company, 120 Idaho 244, 815 P.2d 442 (1991). In
Emery, the insurance policy required arbitration of disputes between the company and its
insured. The policy required the expenses of arbitration to be shared equally between the
company and the insured, "unless they agree otherwise". 120 Idaho at 246-247.
The trial court awarded attorney fees to the insured under LC. § 41-1839. The
insurance company appealed, relying on Bingham County Commissioners v. Interstate
3

Electric Company, 105 Idaho 36, 665 P.2d 1046 (1983), for the proposition that under

I.C. § 7-910 it is beyond the scope of an arbitrator's powers to award attorney fees to one
of the parties absent a contractual agreement to do so. 120 Idaho at 246.
The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's award of attorney fees. In doing so,
the Supreme Court left intact the holding of Bingham County, supra, ruling instead:
However, that limitation upon an arbitrator does not extend
to the authority of the district court to award attorney fees
pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839.
120 Idaho at 246.
The analysis of the Emery court as to why it upheld the award of attorney fees
was as follows:
This Court has previously held that the provisions of I.C. §
41-183 9 become part of the insurance contract to the same
effect as though incorporated therein. Pendlebury v.
Western Casualty and Surety Company, 89 Idaho 456, 406
P.2d 129 (1965). LC.§ 41-1839 provides in pertinent part:
41-1839. Allowance of Attorney Fees in
Suits Against Insurers.-(!) Any insurer
issue any policy, certificate or contract of
insurance, surety, guaranty or indemnity of
any kind or nature whatsoever, which shall
fail for a period of thirty (30) days after
proof of loss has been furnished as provided
in such policy, certificate or contract, to pay
to the person entitled thereto the amount
justly due under such policy, certificate or
contract, shall in any action thereafter
brought against the insurer in any court in
this state for recovery under the terms of the
policy, certificate or contract, pay such
further amounts as the court shall adjudge
reasonable as attorney's fees in such action.
4

Pursuant to this implied term in the insurance contract, the
parties agree that the insurer is obligated to pay attorney
fees if the insured is compelled to file suit to recover under
the insurance policy. As an implied term in the insurance
contract, the statutory language of LC. § 41-1839 modifies
the general American Arbitration Association rule that
parties must bear equally all expenses of arbitration, except
those associated with the presentation of witnesses. Where
the insured is required and compelled to file a lawsuit by
reason of an insurer's refusal to pay in order to recover
under her insurance contract, we hold it is implicit in LC. §
41-1839 that the court shall adjudge a reasonable award of
attorney fees against the insurer.
120 Idaho at 247 (emphasis original)
Because of the nature of the insurance business, LC. § 41-1839 is an implied
contractual part of every insurance policy.

As such, every insurance policy which

requires disputes between insurance companies and their insureds to be resolved by
arbitration include "in the agreement to arbitrate", consistent with LC. § 7-910, the fee
shifting requirements of LC. § 41-1839. That such is the case in Idaho, however, is
unique to the subject of the law pertaining to insurance. The same does not hold true in
other areas.
Hames advocate that LC.§ 12-120(3) should be deemed an implied term of the
contract at issue in this case. In Storrer v. Kier Construction Corp., 129 Idaho 745, 932
P.2d 373 (Ct. App. 1997), that same argument was rejected by the Court of Appeals.
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) is not a required or implied term in any contract of a commercial
nature. If it were, the court in Storrer would not have affirmed the ruling of:
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... the district court [which] rejected Storrer's contention
that a right to recover attorney fees under LC.§ 12-120(3)
is implied into every contract involving a commercial
transaction.
129 Idaho at 747.
Insurance policies are adhesion contracts and the parties do not have the ability
to negotiate the terms included in those policies. As such, the state reserves extensive
police powers to require, on behalf of insureds, that certain provisions must be included
in the policies. LC. § 41-1839 is such a provision.
Ordinary contracts of a commercial nature are not susceptible to the same
concerns that exist relative to contracts of insurance. The parties are, as they were here,
generally able to negotiate the various terms of their contracts. The jurisprudential bases
for imposing, as a contractual provision, the terms of LC. § 41-1839 into every contract
of insurance do not exist for ordinary commercial contracts and the provisions of I.C. §
12-120(3).
Had the parties here desired a fee shifting provision like that in LC. § 12-120(3)
to be part of their contract, they could have easily included it. They did not do so,
however. Their agreement nowhere states that one party would be liable for the other's
attorney fees in the event of a dispute.

The parties' agreement did, however, make

express provision for disputes to be resolved in arbitration. Under LC. § 7-910, each
party is to bear its own expenses in the arbitration in the absence of an agreement to the
contrary. There was no such agreement to the contrary here. As such, Judge Hosack's
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holding is correct, and should be affirmed, with respect to attorney fees incurred in
arbitration by the Hames.
B.

Attorney Fees Incurred Before Arbitration and Attorney Fees
Incurred After Arbitration.

Hames argue that Deelstra v. Hagler, 145 Idaho 922, 188 P.3d 864 (2008)
mandates an award of all the attorney fees incurred by Hames both before and after the
arbitration proceeding below. That argument is misplaced.
Deelstra is limited in application to the issues addressed there. Specifically, the
Supreme Court noted that:
Deelstra does not challenge the District Court's prevailing
party determination, nor the amount of the fee award.
188 P.3d at 866.
In this case, with respect to attorney fees claimed for legal work done before
arbitration, Judge Hosack correctly addressed both the issue of prevailing party and the
amount of the award:
The Court finds that Hames prevailed in the civil litigation
with regard to the issue of compelling arbitration. The
Grease Spot commenced the civil litigation and Harnes
attempted to move the matter into arbitration. Harnes was
successful in doing that. The attorney fees incurred in
context of civil litigation over a commercial transaction in
obtaining the order of a court compelling arbitration should
be properly recoverable in the civil litigation. However,
attorney fees incurred in defending or prosecuting the civil
claims itself are not necessarily issues upon which a party
prevailed in the civil litigation. Since the matter went into
arbitration, a court would have to refer to the arbitration
proceeding to conduct an analysis of the prevailing party.
Instead, this court looks to the issues upon which the party
7

prevailed in civil litigation itself. The issue upon which
Harnes prevailed was the issue compelling arbitration.
Harnes is therefore entitled to an award of attorney fees
incurred in compelling arbitration. The court finds that
16.9 hours of attorney time prior to March 20, 2006 to be
appropriately attributable to compelling arbitration.
R. 80.
Determining the issue of "prevailing party" requires analysis of three principle
factors: (I) the final judgment or result obtained in relation to the relief sought; (2)
whether there were multiple claims or issues between the parties; and (3) the extent to
which each of the parties prevailed on each of the claims or issues. Sanders v. Lanlford,
134 Idaho 322, 325, I P.3d 823 (Ct. App. 2000). The determination of prevailing party is
one of discretion for the trial court. Id.; Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 79 P.3d 723,
727 (2003).
The trial court correctly determined that the only issue upon which Hames
prevailed before the court was the issue of compelling arbitration. R. 80. Armed with
counsel's time entries [R. 64-67] the trial court was able to determine an appropriate
award for the time counsel spent before arbitration on the subject of compelling
arbitration. R. 80. The trial court correctly acted in its discretion and should be affirmed
with respect to the issue of attorney fees allowable prior to the commencement of
arbitration.
Hames also seek attorney fees for events following issuance of the arbitrator's
award. The trial court correctly observed that proceedings for confirmation of arbitrator's
awards under the Uniform Arbitration Act are designed to be summary. R. 79. Indeed,
8

under I.C. § 7-911, an award is automatically confirmed upon presentation thereof absent
a timely objection.
Harnes relied below on Driver v. SI Corp., 139 Idaho 423, 80 P.3d 1024 (2003)
for the proposition that "disbursements" under I.C. § 7-914 include attorney fees. See R.
79.

However, Driver was concerned with "non-meritorious protracted confirmation

challenges".

139 Idaho at 429.

Here, as the trial court noted, no objection to

confirmation was raised by The Grease Spot.

Harnes never sought modification or

correction of the award relative to the question of attorney fees pursuant to LC.§ 7-913.
Review of the record reflects that the Hames' attorney fees incurred after the
arbitrator's initial award detennination were incurred in an unsuccessful attempt to
persuade the arbitrator to change his mind, and otherwise incurred pursuing attorney fee
awards. See R. 64-67. Attorney fees incurred for activities directed at the arbitrator are
not, as discussed above, recoverable under the circumstances of this case. Attorney fees
incurred pursuing attorney fees are likewise not recoverable.
For example, in Kaelker v. Turnbull, 127 Idaho 262, 899 P.2d 972 (1995), the
Koelkers sought and were awarded attorney fees incurred quieting title clouded by breach
of the warrant of seizen. The trial court awarded those attorney fees, plus attorney fees
incurred by the Koelkers in their attempts to recover those attorney fees after title was
quieted.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment as to the attorney fees incurred after
title was quieted, holding that "the only attorney fees which are recoverable as damages
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are those which are directly attributable to quieting title in the property". 127 Idaho at
266.
In Allison v. John M. Biggs, Inc., 121 Idaho 567, 826 P.2d 916 (1992), the
Supreme Court held that the then existing version of LC. § 12-120 "does not provide for a
post-judgment award of attorney fees". 121 Idaho at 568. The current version of LC. §
12-120(5) does allow for post-judgment awards of attorney fees, but only where such fees
are "incurred in attempting to collect on the judgment".
Review of the record in this case reveals that the arbitrator's award was rendered
June 25, 2007.

R. 42-49. Review of counsel's time entries [R. 66) reveals that the

attorney fees incurred by Hames from that date forward were directed at further
proceedings before the arbitrator, and attempts to recover a judgment from the court for
attorney fees. The obtainment of quiet title in the Kaelker case is analogous to the entry
of the arbitrator's award in the present case. The Koelkers were entitled to recover the
attorney fees they incurred obtaining quiet title as damages. However, once quiet title
was obtained, the legal bases upon which attorney fees could be awarded ceased to exist.
In the absence of some other statutory or contractual basis for an award of attorney fees
thereafter, the Koelkers were not entitled to recover such fees.
In this case, the contest over the merits of the parties' dispute over their
"commercial transaction" was resolved upon entry of the arbitrator's Memorandum
Decision. From that point forwarded, Hames' legal efforts have been directed at not the
merits of the underlying case, but on their quest to recover attorney fees. LC.§ 12-120(5)
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clearly indicates that post-judgment attorney fees are awardable only with respect to
attempts to collect on a judgment. Such is not an allowable basis for an award of attorney
fees.
Judge Hosack's ruling on the subject of attorney fees incurred after arbitration is
consistent with the above. Under the circumstances of this case, the only "necessary"
step required for Harnes to reduce the arbitrator's award to a judgment was the ministerial
act described in LC.§§ 7-911 and 7-914. In the words of Judge Hosack:
It is this Court's finding that in a normal confirmation of
arbitration proceedings pursuant to 7-914, an award of
attorney fees is unnecessary. The Court finds that this is
true in the instant case as well.

R. 79.
It is clear that Judge Hosack perceived the issue before him as one within his

discretion.

It is also clear that Judge Hosack correctly perceived that the summary

ministerial task of reducing the arbitrator's award to a judgment did not warrant an
assessment of attorney fees. The work done was secretarial in nature and Judge Hosack
was correct in his ruling.
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III. CONCLUSION
The trial court's assessment of costs and attorney fees was correct in all respects.
This court is respectfully requested to affirm the District Court.
DATED this

9~ay of October, 2008.
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